assassination at the hands of a Kharijite third party. Certainly, a long period of indecisive stalemate between the two rivals is conceivable. However, it seems unlikely that the stronger of the two would not have made a determined bid for victory during the two years 659-60 that followed the end of arbitration. The Islamic tradition implies that defections to the Kharijites and the loss of Egypt had so weakened' All by mid-658 that he was unable to launch a new campaign against Mu ' liwiya I2 But then, if 'All were really in such a weak position, why did Mu ' liwiya not attack him more vigorously in 659 or 660?
All the more so since, as early as July 658, MU'liwiya had reportedly been in control of Egypt, whose wealth was believed to be a key factor in the civil war: according to al-Tabarr, for example, Mu ' liwiya ' hoped that if he won control over Egypt, he would also be victorious in the war against ' AIr on account of the huge sum that was raised from its kharlij. '" Yet the Islamic tradition records that in spite of his key victory in Egypt and his own elevation to the caliphate, Mu'liwiya refrained from attacking 'Ali in force during the second half of the civil war. This seems questionable.
Source-evidence contradicting the standard account
In fact, the report on Mu'liwiya's takeover of Egypt is not only .suspicious on internal grounds but is also implicitly contradicted by several sources. Once more, the Islamic tradition records that 'Amr ibn al-'As, MU'liwiya's ally, invaded Egypt with a small army in Safar 38/July 658 and rapidly overcame feeble resistance by the anti-Umayyad faction in the country." Remarkably, though, alTabarr comments at one point on the strength of the anti-Umayyad faction in Egypt, which seems to cast doubt on the report he makes elsewhere that the Umayyads conquered the country easily: 12 
Ibid.
Mu'liwiya's only concern was Egypt, fearing its fighting men because of their proximity to him, and the strength of their enmity to anyone who was of the opinion of 'Uthman. Nevertheless, Mu'awiya knew that a group there had found the killing of 'Uthman reprehensible and opposed 'AliI' II This notice indicates that only a minority of Arabs in Egypt ('a group') favoured MU'awiya and his deputy 'Amr ibn al-'As, who had been the first Arab governor of Egypt from 641 to 644. The majority sympathized with 'Uthman's murderers, Egyptian Arabs who, in effect, had represented them in laying their grievances before 'Uthman. And they naturally supported' All against 'Uthman's kinsman and avenger Mu'awiya. Equally, Qays ibn Sa'd, governor of Egypt at 'Uthman's death and indeed the murdered caliph's protege and foster-brother, opposed the restoration of his predecessor' Amr ibn al-' As. Therefore, ai-Tabari's report that most ofthe Egyptian Arabs were determinedly opposed to Mu'awiya and 'Amr sounds highly plausible.
But to go further, the standard account of the civil war should be compared with reports from the Christian historical tradition. 16 Differences are sometimes plainly attributable to error on the part of the Christian sources, but this is not always the case n In fact, three Christian sources reliably contradict the Islamic tradition's report that Egypt fell quickly under Mu'awiya's control in July 658.
The first source is the Maronite Chronicle, a document preserved in a single Syriac manuscript thought to be of eighth-or ninth-century date. The manuscript has two sections, of which the second covers the years 657-64. Despite a foliolength lacuna and a textual discrepancy over the years AG972 and AG973, this second section of the chronicle has a narrative, anecdotal style with an unusual degree of detail and accurate dating, as, for example, in the notice: 'there was frost in the early morning of Wednesday, 13 April, and the white grapevines were withered by it' (the day and date coincided in 662). The editors of the Maronite XI.12, 449-50, ed. I.-B. Chabot, Brussels, 1963; Chronicle 1234, 277-80, ed 
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Chronicle believe that it was compiled by a contemporary of the events described, although it may have been incorporated into a later history. "
The second section of the chronicle begins with the following notice:
'AIT, too, threatened to go up once again against Mu' awiya, but they struck him while he was at prayer in al-Hira and killed him. Mu'awiya went down to al-Hlra, where all the Arab forces there gave their right hand to him in allegiance, whereupon he returned to Damascus. In AG 970 (September 658-September 659), the 17'h year of Constans, on a Friday in June [7th June, 659] , at the second hour, there was a violent earthquake in Palestine, and many places there collapsed.
The earthquake report suggests that ' Ali's death occurred about t~o years earlier than the date of Ramadan 40/January 661 given in the Islamic tradition. However, allowing the possibility that entries have been transposed, let us ignore the dating of this notice and concentrate on its content. The phrase 'once again' surel y refers to 'Ali's fi rst attack on Mu'awiya, which ended in the bloody but inconclusive battle ofSiffin in July 657. The chronicle thus indicates that 'AIT was in a position to attack MU'awiya a second time shortly before his death. Yet' AIT had been faced with opposition in Iraq and Iran since early 658: he could hardly have mounted a second major attack against Syria if, in addition, Egypt had fallen under Mu' awiya's control in Jul y 658. If ' AIT had been preparing such an attack shortly before his death, it seems reasonable to assume that he still had the support of Egypt.
The Islamic tradition's report on Egypt during the civil war is further called into question by generally accepted evidence from the Chronographia of Theophanes (d.813) that Mu' awiya made a humiliating truce wi th the Empire, probably in 659. According to the Chronographia:
In this year [AM6150 = AG969/September 657-September 658], peace was concluded between Romans and Arabs after Mauias had sent an embassy, because of the rebellion, offering that the Arabs should pay the Romans a daily tribute of 1,000 solidi, one horse, and one slave. In the same year, there was a violent earthquake and buildings collapsed in Syria and Palestine in the month of Daisios, indi ction 2. 19 18 Thcodor Noldeke, Fran90is Nau, E. W. Brooks, Andrew Palmer. Lammens suggested Ihat the Maronite Chroni cle formed part of the world history written in the tenth century by Qays al-Mariini, a wri ter only known to us from the report ofal-Mas'udi: Hoyland 1997: 135-8. This is possible; in any case, however, the extant second section described above seems contemporary.
Theophanes thus states that the truce was made in the year AG969/September 657 September 658. However, this date may be one year early because he goes on to specify tbat the truce occurred 'in the same year' as the violent earthquake of Daisios (May/June) in Syria and Palestine.20 The notice of the Maronite Chronicle, quoted above, also records a violent earthquake in Palestine, dated precisely to Friday, 7th June, 659, which must surely be the same earthquake." Hence, it may be better to date the truce to the following year AG970/September 658-September 659. The alteration should be acceptable since the Chronographia frequently reports seventh-century events as occurring one year earlier than do most other sources.
But whether the truce was concluded in 658 or 659, the fact that it was made at all makes it questionable that Mu'awiya took control of Eb'YPt in July 658, which would have greatly added to his resources and strength. For the truce, the first sought by the Islamic State from its enemy, was a humiliating admission of weakness. It stipulated that Mu'awiya pay the Empire 1000 solidi daily, an amount equal to that which the Empire itself had reportedly paid during the previous truce of651-3. At the rate of 72 solidi per pound, the resulting sum of365 ,000 solidi per year amounted to over 5000 pounds of gold -much more than the 3000 per year that Mu' awiya agreed to pay the Empire in 678, after the failure of the second assault on Constantinople and the outbreak of the Mardaite revolt in Syria." Mu'awiya had not been prepared to pay this heavy price before the Siffin campaign in spring-summer 657, when he certainly controlled only Syria and was directly threatened by 'All; would he have done so then in 658 or 659, soon after his reported takeover of Egypt? It seems most unlikely.
The third Christian source is Agapius (Mahbiib), an otherwise unknown Melkite bishop of Manbij who wrote a world history from Creation to his own time in the 940s." Comparison with Theophane. and the Syriac chroniclers shows that, from the Muslim conquest to the 750s, Agapius relies largely on a common source, which is shown to be Theophilus of Edessa (d.785) .24 However, he probably also relied on a Muslim source for the history of early Islam up to and including the first civil war, for which he gives a folio-length account. On the ro le of Egypt in the civil war, Agapius emphasizes its importance and gives a description of events that is substantially different from the standard account's:
'All conferred the administration of Egypt upon Qays ibn Sa'fd [Ibn Sa' d] who stayed there and governed it; but Mu'awiya intrigued against him and had him deposed. Then MU'awiya and' Amr ibn ai-As went to Muhammad ibn Hazifah (Hudhayfah), who was in Egypt and whom 'All had made governor of it. They deceived him and made him depart for al-' Arfsh. Then' All nominated Hakam ibn ai-Salt to Egypt. Mu'awiya and 'Amr advanced towards him and set up siege engines against him; then he went out against them with thirty of his companions, and they killed him. After that, 'All sent Qays ibn Sa'fd against Egypt. Allegiance was sworn to Hasan ibn' All in the year 41 (May 66 I-April 662) of the Arabs. Then Mu'awiya went to Iraq, and Hasan ibn' AlI [went] to him. They met at Meskene in the Sawiid, the province [of Kufa], and they made peace in writing on certain conditions and before eyewitnesses."
From this account, it seems that Mu' awiya and 'Amr invaded Egypt at least twice yet were unable on each occasion to take control of the country. Qays ibn Sa'd, who had governed Egypt for twelve years by the time of 'Uthman's death, clearly opposed the Umayyads and supported 'All throughout the civil war. Mu'iiwiya managed to secure his deposition, but only to see him replaced by two further nominees of 'A If. The second was killed in battle by Mu'awiya and 'Amr, but it does not follow that Egypt fell into their hands, for' All then dispatched Qays ibn Sa'd to Egypt again, with unstated results. Agapius' account clearly contradicts the standard account's report of a rapid take-over of Egypt in July 658. Rather, it indicates a long and complex struggle for control of the country, and the list of 'AlI's nominees, particularly the name of Qays ibn Sa'd at beginning and end, implies that the anti-Umayyad party had the upper hand.
Sebeos' variant account of the civil war and corroboration in Chronicle 1234
Evidence from the four sources quoted -al-TabarI, the Maronite Chronicle, Theophanes, and Agapius -together cast doubt on the Islamic tradition's report that Mu'iiwiya conquered Egypt with ease in mid-658, although they do not offer an alternative explanation. For a variant account of Egypt's role in the civil war, we must now turn to another Christian source whose remarkable description of the civil war seriously challenges the validity of the standard account. This is the History of the Armenian writer Sebeos, whose equally remarkable account of a disastrous Arab attack on Constantinople in 654 has been considered in a previous article."
There is some historiographical controversy over Sebeos' History, mainly because it cannot be attributed with certainty to the bishop Sebeos whose name is included in several medieval lists of Armenian historians as the author of a ' history of Heraclius' 27 Nevertheless, the attribution of the work to this bishop Sebeos, made by the discoverer of the manuscripts in the 1830s and by the original editor in 1851, remains a more plausible choice than any other. The History is informed by a single purpose: from the particular standpoint of the writer's native Armenia, to interpret the upheavals of the seventh century as fulfilling Daniel's prophecies and ushering in the penultimate age of the world. The writer appears throughout as a competent and reliable historian. He uses original documents extensively and places them coherently within a chronological framework. Where his material is closely paralleled by other sources, a comparison shows him to be equal or superior in chronological accuracy, extent of information, and personal objectivity." 
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The extent of biblical references and the interest shown in theological controversy indicate that the writer was an Annenian Monophysite churchman. His reference to eyewimesses and his close knowledge ofthe Sasanian Empire indicate that he lived during the period he covered, being born around 600 and writing most of the History around the middle of the century" Finally, the History is demonstrably a unified work: though it frequently changes topics and digresses from the chronological thread of the narrative, there is no sign of interpolation. [n short, the writer known as Sebeos is a reliable source by all standard measures; therefore, his reports on the events of his time must be treated with respect. Sebeos' account of the civil war comes at the very end of his History and may be a postscript written in the early 660s, several years after the main body ofthe text. The account has been thoroughly commented by James Howard-Johnston. 30 It can be divided into two parts, the first of which follows:" Now God sent a disturbance among the armies of the sons of Ismaei, and their unity was split. They fell into mutual conflict and divided into four sections. One part [was composed of] those in the direction of India; one part, those who occupied Asorestan [Syria] and the north; one part, those in Egypt and in the regions of the T'eta[k' ;" one part in the territory of the Arabs and the place called Askarawn." They began to fight with each other and to kill each other with enormous slaughter. The [army] in Egypt and that in the area of the Arabs united; they killed their king, plundered the multitude of treasures, and installed another king. Then they went to their respective areas. That prince who was in the region of Asorestan, their prince called Mu ' awiya, was the second after their king. When he saw what had occurred, he brought together his troops, went into the desert, slew that other king whom they had installed, waged war with the army in the region of the Arabs, and inflicted great slaughter on them. He returned very victoriously to Asorestan."
Dates are absent, and no protagonists are named except Mu 'awiya. Nevertheless, this first part of Sebeos' account refers clearly enough to 'Uthman's murder by Egyptian Arabs, ' AIT's elevation to the caliphate, the civil war between Mu' awiya and 'AlI, and' All's death. At the end, it reports that Mu'awiya killed ' AlI ('that other king whom they had installed'). This statement does not square with the Islamic tradition's record that' AlI was assassinated by the Kharijite Ibn Muljam in the mosque at Kiifa, but the discrepancy does not affect the sequence of events."
However, this first part of Sebeos' account does make clear that the civil war was not simply a two-sided conflict between 'AlI and Mu' awiya. Rather, the Islamic State, described as 'the armies of the sons of Ismael ', was divided after 'Uthman's death into four parts. The exact definition of these divisions is problematic, but the general interpretation is straightforward and compelling. 'Uthman's murder unleashed a complex struggle involving peripheral Arab forces in Egypt and Iran besides those in the central regions Of Syria and Iraq. 'All's death and Mu'awiya's take-over of Iraq and Arabia merely ended one dimension of the civil war, according to Sebeos. He goes on to describe the rest of the conflict in the last paragraph of his History. It is this second part that diverges radically from the standard account's version:
He [Mu'awiya] returned very victoriously to Asorestan [after' All's death and the takeover of Iraq]. But the army that was in Egypt united with the king of the Greeks, made a treaty, and joined him. The host of troops, numbering about 15,000, believed in Christ and was baptized. The blood of the slaughter of immense multitudes flowed thickly among the armies of Ismael. Warfare afflicted them as they engaged in mutual carnage. They were unable to refrain for the least moment from the sword and captivity and fierce battles by sea and by land, until Mu'awiya prevailed and conquered. Having brought them into submission to himself, he rules over the possessions of the sons ofIsmael and makes peace with all. 36 Thus, according to the Armenian historian, soon after ' AlI's death and Mu' awiya's takeover ofIraq -that is, in mid-to late-66 I -the Arab army in Egypt formed an alliance with the Empire, sealing it by renouncing Islam and adopting Christianity. Fighting on land and sea continued for some time; the eventual result was Mu'awiya's complete victory over all his opponents and re-establishment of the Islamic State. With the single exception of James Howard-Johnston 's 1999 commentary, this account bas been practically ignored by modem scholarship. Even if considered, however, it would be unlikely to gain widespread acceptance because corroborating evidence is insufficient. It is weaker even than the corroboration for Sebeos' account of the Arab attack on Constantinople in 654 37 In that case, the paucity of direct corroboration may be explained by the combination oftwo factors: the decision to vilify the memory of Constans II after the condemnation of Monotheletism; and the assimilation of the event in popular memory with the Arabs' later failed assault on Constantinople in 674-8. But neither of these factors is available in the present argument. Nor is the undeniable scarcity of extant evidence for this period a wholly satisfactory explanation. Nevertheless, we shall argue for the plausibility of Sebeos' account with the aim at least of casting doubt on the standard account of the civil war based on the Islamic tradition. Corroborating evidence (such as it is) will be presented, arguments in favour fielded, and the course of the civil war reconstructed and fitted into the context of events during the early 660s.
The The last sentence of this precisely dated notice gives an intriguing piece of information that seems never to have attracted the attention of commentators. It states unequivocally that a Byzantine force was present in Egypt in 664-5. Now, it is possible that the entry refers merely to a Byzantine naval raid on the Egyptian coast that was repulsed by the Arabs with heavy loss. In 673, for example, such a raid occurred in order to disrupt the gathering Arab naval offensive against Constantinople, and several others are recorded against Egypt, Barqa, and the Syrian coast during the later seventh and eighth centuries.'· Nevertheless, the wording of this notice allows for an alternative and perhaps more fitting interpretation. First, five thousand seems a rather large number for a raiding force. And secondly, the report states that Mu'awiya 'invaded' Egypt in order to attack the Byzantines. Perhaps Mu'awiya simply led an army into Egypt to help his governor' Amr ibn al-' As against Byzantine raiders. But the use of the word 'invaded' is remarkable, suggesting that the Byzantines were present in Egypt in a more pennanent way and in greater force, and that, to destroy them, Mu'awiya had to invade the country in late 664 or early 665. 41 Therefore, we sbould consider the possibility of a connection between this notice in Chronicle 1234 and Sebeos' account of Egyptian events during the civil war. For the parallel elements are clear: both refer to conflict in Egypt that involved the Byzantines in some manner and at roughly the same time (in Chronicle 1234's report, September 664-March 665: in Sebeos' History, the period beginning with Mu'awiya's takeover of Iraq in mid-66I and ending with his complete victory at an unspecified later date, but probably by 665, when the Muslims reportedly invaded North Africa)."
Reconstruction of the civil war during the early 660s and arguments in favour
The standard account's report that Egypt fell easily to Mu'awiya in mid-658 has been variously called into question by the circumstantial evidence of al-Tabari, the Maronite Chronicle, Theophanes, and Agapius.lfMu'awiya failed to take Egypt then or afterwards, it becomes understandable why he concluded the truce with Byzantium in 659, why he did not attack 'AlI vigorously, and why 'AlI, for his part, was reportedly preparing to attack Mu'awiya again shortly before his death.
We may now place this circumstantial evidence besides the direct evidence of Seheos and Chronicle 1234 in order tOTeconstruct tbe second half of the civil war, and especially the role of Egypt.
The stalemate prevailed between Mu'awiya and ' All throughout 659 and 660, as the Islamic tradition records, but with the important difference that Egypt remained independent of and hostile to Mu'awiya. In fact, Egypt remained as it had been since '" Dennett 1948: 169 likewise. Deeply implicated in the murder of Mu'awiya's kinsman, they feared the consequences of doing so; equally, surrender to Mu'awiya would have terminated the practical independence they had enjoyed since 656. Hence the Egyptian Arabs took the bold step that Sebeos took care to record, probably because it was so striking to a contemporary -that is, they defected altogether from the Islamic State and allied with the Empire. Furthermore, in order to establish their good faith and guarantee unstinting assistance, the Egyptian Arabs abandoned Islam and accepted baptism en masse into the Byzantine or Melkite Catholic Church. Consequently, they received assistance that enabled them to defend Egypt against Mu' awiya. This assistance included the dispatch of a Byzantine army to Egypt, not a raiding force but a permanent reinforcement. The expeditionary force is recorded by Chronicle 1234 as having numbered 5000 at the time of its eventual destruction by Mu'awiya in 664-5, but it may have been larger initially.4s
This revolution in affairs must have taken place in the second half of 661. Not surprisingly, then, we learn from the Maronite Chronicle that Mu'awiya terminated the truce with the Empire the following spring." For the years 662, 663, and 664, we only have record of Mu'awiya's offensives into Asia Minor; however, if our reconstruction of events is valid, it was his strategic priority to conquer Egypt. Similarly, however, it must also have been Byzantium's strategic priority during these years to keep Egypt out ofMu'awiya 's hands. Consequently, Egypt was the central theatre of conflict for three years until the period September 664-March 665, when it fell to an invasion led by Mu'awiya in person. Of this last stage of the Arab civil war, Sebeos gives us the impression, in Howard-Johnston's words, that 'all the armies which he enumerated were involved, that the fighting was widespread and the casualties heavy. '47 Also, a vague but suggestive allusion comes in the History of the Patriarchs, a tenth-century compilation of earlier Lives of the Coptic patriarchs of Alexandria. Of special interest are the Lives of patriarchs Benjamin (641-61) and Agathon (661-77), written by the archdeacon George shortly before 720. 48 Following the Muslim conquest of Egypt, this author only once mentions the Arab-Byzantine war that continued with little interruption up to his own time. Interestingly, the statement comes immediately after the enthronement of Agathon is recorded for 661 : This conjectural account offers one explanation of the reports in Sebeos and Chronicle 1234. Another explanation, not necessarily more reasonable but likely more acceptable in the present climate of opinion, would assert that the reports are unconnected: Chronicle 1234's report refers to a short and disastrous Byzantine naval raid against Egypt, while Sebeos' report on the mass conversion of the Egyptian Arabs is fancy or, at best, a large exaggeration -stemming perhaps from established reports that Christian Arab aHies of tbe Empire who had made nominal conversions to Islam during the Islamic conquest of Syria later reverted to their old aHegiance and settled in Asia Minor. The principal example here is the case of Jabala ibn al-Ayham, the last Ghassanid ruler, who reportedly renounced Islam and fled to the Empire with 30,000 of his foHowers in 640 or 641." As it stands, then, Sebeos' report of the Egyptian Arab army's mass conversion would be viewed scepticaHy by most modem historians. Nevertheless, with a single exception, his History seems consistently reliable elsewhere: in particular, even his description of the 654 attack on Constantinople and its astonishing debacle can be substantiated.'1 It is also worth stressing that James Howard Johnston, the only historian who has given Sebeos' report on the mass conversion any consideration, is by no means sceptical. Indeed, he points out, somewhat sardonicaHy, that 'a stray reference in early Islamic tradition to Muslims converting to Christianity [ ... J at this time because of the deadly strife within the congregation of Muhammad (in Bahrain) may ease some ofthe incredulity which Sebeos' statement is likely to arouse in Islamicists. '52 Howard-Johnston's comment should give pause for reflection on the fact that our perspective of the seventh century is clouded by hindsight. Men living in the 650s could not possibly have held in their minds the concept indelibly fixed in our ownof Islam as a historical movement spread though a great expanse of space and time. It foHows, then, that under circumstances of mi li tary defeat and political disintegration, they could weH have regarded Islam as a momentary phenomenon destined to vanish as rapidly as it had arisen twenty years previously. 53 Keeping fuHy in mind this psychological element, let us now recaH the probability that the Arabs had launched a vast naval attack on Constantinople in 654, in which their fleet had been suddenly and completely destroyed by a storm within sight of the city. Let us also recall that the Islamic State broke into several pieces only two years afterwards, the armies of conquest now turning upon one another in violent combat. Under these circumstances, it would not be surprising if the confidence of the Muslims in their own destiny was deeply shaken during the later 650s -notwithstanding their timely naval victory at Phoenix in 655, which had done no more than halt the Byzantine counter-attack.
Two secondary points should also be noted. First, the Arab army in Egypt included large groups of Syrians from the Judham and Qudii'a (Kalb) tribal confederacies, both of which had previously been allies of Byzantium and, at least in the case of the Qudii'a, mainly Christian." These tribesmen settled in al-Fustat immediately after its establishment and drew military stipends. Only twenty years after the conquest, therefore, a Christian background influence from formerly Christian soldiers and sometimes still-Christian family members would have been apparent within the Egyptian Arab army." Secondly, if the Egyptian Arab soldiers had converted en masse, they would naturally have joined the Chalcedonian Melkite Church, thereby confirming their dominion over the Monophysite native Egyptians (rather as Germanic tribal units ofthe Roman army favoured Arianism as a badge of privilege over their Catholic subject populations).
The context of events and the strategy of Constans II
Sebeos reports that the Egyptian Arabs broke with the Islamic State, converted to Christianity, and came under the Empire's protection for more than three years (late 661-early 665). With the indirect corroboration of Chronicle 1234, and with awareness of the failed Arab attack on Constantinople in 654, we can reconstruct the second half of the civil war, especially its Egyptian theatre, in a manner that plausibly incorporates Sebeos' account. In contrast, the standard account of the civil war based on Islamic sources reports.that Mu'iiwiya took over Egypt easily in mid-658. But this report seems to be internally inconsistent and is indirectly contradicted by notices in four sources. The standard account's silence on the Egyptian events reported by Sebeos should cause no surprise: such events would probably never have entered the Islamic tradition, still less have been included in the written compilations made 100- 150 years later. Finally, after the evidence and argument presented, it becomes easier to appeal to the scarcity of extant material for this period as explanation for the lack of direct corroboration for Sebeos in Christian sources.
The case has been presented, but it remains to be fittingly framed within the context of surrounding events during the period 66 1-5. This is the period after ' All's death -the second half of the Arab civil war, which finds no place in the standard account but is recorded in the last paragraph of Sebeos' History.
First, Mu'awiya was of course greatl y strengthened by the reunification of the Islamic State's central territories of Syria, Arabia, and Iraq. However, he was unable to end the civil war rapidly, not only because of Byzantine assistance to Egypt, but also because of the need to complete operations in the East. Sebeos' account records that independent Arab forces arose in the East after 'Uthman's death, one ' towards India' and the other in Khurasan ('the region of the T'etalk' ). The Islamic tradition tends to confirm this, recording that soon after ' Uthman's death, the governors he had appoi nted for Khurasan and Sijistan withdrew to Mu'awiya in Syria. Nor does it appear that ' All' ever established his authority in these regions" As soon as Mu'awiya took control of Iraq, the Islamic tradition continues, he dispatched hi s lieutenants to retake Khurasan and Sijistan . It is likely that these generals were confronted by anti-Umayyad Arab forces in the East and certain that they spent years campaigning against native Iranian and Ephthalite rebels, whose stronghold of Kabul probably did not fall until 665." In connection here is the valuable record from nonIslami c sources that Peroz, son of the last Sasanian king, invaded Sijistan from India during the Arab civil war but was killed before reaching Khurasan."
A separate item gives further evidence of conditions in the East and of Byzantium 'S deep involvement in the territories of the fragmented Islamic State during the civil war. The Armenian historian Movses Daskhurants' i, probably writing in the early eighth century, records in a postscript to his history that the emperor Constans personally led an expedition in the 19th year of his reign (659-60) through Armenia to the regions west and south-west of the Caspian Sea -Albania, Adharbayjan, and Media."
All these regions had formed part of the Islamic State, but their peoples had rebelled in 655 and destroyed an Arab army sent against them. Since then, they had maintained their independence and entered into alliance with the Empire, for Movses records that Juansher, prince of Media, had previously offered allegiance to Constans.
60 Presumably, too, he had adopted Christianity: Media, previously part of the Sasanian Empire, had not been a Christian region, yet Movses records that Juansher was Christian when Cons tans gave him audience in 659-60, conferring on him the titles of 'patrician and governor of the east'." This account is remarkable. First, by reporting the presence of the emperor in regions so far eastwards, it confirms that the Islamic State's power no longer layover much of the Iranian plateau at this time. Secondly, it offers a striking precedent and parallel to Sebeos' report on the Egyptian Arabs in 661. In each case, internal opponents of the Islamic State offer alliance with Byzantium and profession of the Christian faith; their offer is accepted and their struggle for independence encouraged. The difference between the two cases is that one group of rebels belonged to the conquered native population, whereas the other was reportedly a dissident group among the Arab conquerors.
The emperor Cons tans returned from the East to Constantinople in 660, but he left the capital again for new operations, probably in the first half of661 62 According to Latin sources, he advanced overland to Thessalonica and thence to Athens, where he resided until spring 663. 63 These sources do not tell us why he spent so long in Athens, but Theophanes and Elie ofNisibis record that he had previously campaigned against Slav tribes, probably in Macedonia and Thrace." From this, it may be inferred that he spent 661 and 662 campaigning against other Slav tribes who had occupied much of southern Greece, especially the Peloponnese." Even so, we may doubt that Constans was solely or even mainly preoccupied with the Slavs in these crucial years when MU'awiya gained Iraq (July 661) and, ending the truce, resumed the war against the Empire (spring 662).
In fact, if the Egyptian Arabs had indeed defected from the Islamic State and allied with Byzantium in late 661, we may speculate that Constans' residence in took place in 665 and again in 669. 70 We should note, however, that Constans' arrival in Italy came at least six months after Mu'liwiya had broken the truce and renewed the Muslim offensive in Asia Minor. The ending of the truce is recorded by the Maronite Chronicle:
The following year there was frost in the early morning of Wednesday, 13 April, and the white grapevines were withered by it. When Mu'liwiya had acquired the power that he had aimed at and was at rest from the wars of his people, he broke the peace settlement with the Romans and refused to accept peace from them any longer. Rather he said, ' If the Romans want peace, let them surrender their weapons, and pay .the tax.'71
The date Wednesday, 13
ili April occurred only in 662 during that decade, and the ending of the truce is reported immediately afterwards. It seems reasonable then to suppose that the truce, having lasted between three and four years, ended between April and September 662 (the chronicle's entries are recorded anna Graecorum, from September to September). Indeed, there is evidence that the Arabs renewed their land offensive against Asia Minor in 662, and repeated their attacks every year thereafter for well over a decade, culminating in their second major assault against Constantinople from 674 to 67772 Under such circumstances, it does not seem likely that the emperor intended to subjugate the Lombards of southern Italy. On the other hand, it was certainly necessary to strengthen Sicily and North Africa, rich but poorly defended provinces that the Arabs had already attacked during the late 640s and early 650S73 Indeed, the vigorous renewal of the Muslim westward offensive offers ample explanation for Constans' long stay at Syracuse: only after his death and the recall of his forces in 668 were the Muslims able to devastate Sicily and establish a permanent foothold in North Africa (669-670).
Yet, if we are to rely upon the combined accounts of Sebeos and Chronicle 1234, concern for North Africa could not have prompted Cons tans ' move to Italy in spring 663 and his settlement in Syracuse a few months later. For the Muslims could We are therefore driven to speculate that Constans' move to the West, like his move to Athens, was strategically connected to Egypt.
But Athens was much better placed than Syracuse in this regard: what explanation, then, can be offered for Constans' move from Greece to Sicily? In connection, let us note the possibility that, very soon after the submission of Iraq in July 661 , Mu' awiya rapidly built up Muslim naval power ITom the Syrian bases of Acre and Tyre. Such at least is implied by the following record in the Islamic tradition: A body of Persians was transplanted in the year 42 (662-3) by Mu'awiya ITom Ba'iabakk, Hims, and Antioch to the seacoast of the Jordan, i.e. Tyre, Acre, and other places; and he transplanted in the same year, or one year before (661-2) or after, certain Asawira from ai-Basra and al-Kufa and certain Persians from Ba'iabakk and Hims to Antioch." Perhaps Mu'awiya was spurred to this effort by his failure to take control of Egypt and its important naval bases. The Egyptian fleet was probably under his own, not the Egyptian governor's, direct control before the civil war began;" consequently, it may have remained loyal -Sebeos specifies only the Egyptian Arab army's involvement in the civil war and defection from the Islamic State. But the fleet could not have operated effectively without strong bases; therefore, MU'awiya may have built up the Syrian ports from 661 because he no longer controlled the vast Egyptian bases at Alexandria and al-Fustat. These had largely sustained his naval offensive against Byzantium from 649 to 654, so that the hostility of the Egyptian Arabs throughout the civil war may have initially crippled Mu'awiya's naval capacity. Speculative this may be, but there is certainly no mention of Muslim naval activity in the Mediterranean for many years after the battle of Phoenix in 655 , and Mu'awiya's naval weakness probably intluenced his conclusion of the humiliating truce with the Empire from 659-62. Finally, his rapid success in building up Syrian-based seapower from 661 is indicated by the report that a Muslim force nominally led by Mu' awiya's son YazId crossed the Sea of Marrnara into Europe in 663. 76 This daring strike would hardly have been possible unless Constans had sailed to Italy with much of the imperial tleet shortly beforehand. More significantly, though, the report reveals Mu'awiya's renewed naval strength in the eastern Mediterranean at this time. We may deduce in consequence that Egypt (always assuming that it was still in the Byzantine camp) was not only exposed to attack by land but also increasingly isolated from assistance by sea.
To conclude this line of speculation, Constans' move to Athens and later to Syracuse may have been governed by the strategic priority of maintaining Egypt's resistance against Mu' awiya in the face of increasingly heavy odds. This priority overrode even the defence of Asia Minor since Cons tans, confident perhaps of the capital's invincibility, took with him a large part of the Empire's military force to Greece and Sicily. Once more, if we rely upon the sources referred to, then the Slavs, the Lombards, and North Africa could not have been the main strategic object of this force. Egypt was the strategic object, but since no other source informs us of Egyptian events in the early 660s, it is fruitless to speculate further on whether or how Constans may have deployed forces from Sicily towards Egypt. 77 We are consequently brought to a halt, left with the certain knowledge that Constans' far-flung strategy to contain Mu'awiya eventually failed in both East and West and prepared the way for renewed Muslim advance.
78
The standard account ofthe civil war is based on oral traditions grouped around a handful of key events and compiled long afterwards. Quite conceivably, it did not record important events of the civil war. Sebeos, on the other hand, is a contemporary writer and demonstrably a trustworthy historian: his description ofthe 654 attack on Constantinople can be reasonably defended as the only surviving account of a historical· event. Sebeos' report that the Egyptian Arabs defected from the Islamic State during the civil war seems neither incredible in itself nor inconsistent with the surrounding political and military context. Faced with the alternatives of ignoring Sebeos's account of Egypt in the Arab civil war or attempting to reconcile it with the standard account, one should choose the latter." July2011 77 Severus ibn al-Muqaffa'(l947) has already been quoted (n.4 8) as recording immediately after the enthonement of patriarch Agathon in 661: 'Now the Muslims were fighting against (he Romans furiously. ' He continues: 'And the Romans had a prince whose name was Tiberius (Constans), whom they had made their ruler, and who possessed many islands. So the Muslims took the Romans captive, and carried them away from their own country to a strange land. Thus with regard to Sicily and all its provinces, they took possession of that island and ravaged it and brought the people captives to Egypt.' This passage is the only reference in the work to the Arab-Byzantine war during the seventh century: it seems to record the Muslim attack on Sicily in 669. 78 After ten years of rebellion, the rebel prince of Media and ally ofthe Empire, Juansher, submitted to Mu'awiya in 665: Thomson and Howard-Johnston 1999: 287-8. 79 Sebeos' equally variant account of the origins ofisiam has been given close attention in Crone and Cook 1977: 3-9; Hoyland 1995: 89-102. 
